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When risks are interdependent, an agent´s decision to self-protect affects the loss probabilites 
faced by others. Due to these externalities, economic agents invest too little in prevention 
relative to the socially efficient level by ignoring marginal external costs or benefits conferred 
on others. This paper analyzes an insurance market with externalities of loss prevention. It is 
shown in a model with heterogenous agents and imperfect information that a monopolistic 
insurer can achieve the social optimum by engaging in premium discrimination. An insurance 
monopoly reduces not only costs of risk selection, but may also play an important social role 
in loss prevention. 
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1. Introduction
Wealth is subject to possible loss, and therefore rational agents (private ﬁrms or individuals)
desire to invest in loss prevention activities that reduce the probability of loss.1An interesting
feature of individual loss prevention is that it may affect the risks faced by others. In many
cases of individual investment decisions, the ultimate risk of each decision-maker depends in
some way on the aggregate actions of others. The risks are interdependent. The individual
r i s kc a nt h e nb eb r o k e nd o w ni n t od i r e c ta n di n d i rect sources. The direct risk arises due to an
agent´s own actions, and can be reduced or eliminated by an investment in prevention. The
indirect risk lies entirely in the hands of other agents. A great variety of problems share such
risk interdependencies. As an illustration, consider the following examples.
Airline baggage security
Due to the network structure of (inter-)national ﬂights, the security at one airport may have
impacts on the security at other airports. More speciﬁcally, the risk that an aircraft of an
airline, say, airline A, is harmed by an explosive device on board, depends not only on its own
security system, but also on the fact that other airlines, say B,C etc. screen luggage items that
aretransferredintoanaircraftofA, too. Ingeneral, luggageitemstransferredbetweenaircrafts
are almost never screened, for reasons of cost andtiming. One trusts, in fact, that these luggage
items were already screened at their departure terminal. The acquisition of a safety system by
A can therefore only eliminate the risk of damage resulting from directly boarding passengers.
The risk that dangerous luggage is transferred from other aircrafts cannot be excluded in this
way. This indirect risk depends on the security systems at other airports.2
Shared computer resources
Suppose an owner of a small business has a desktop computer with its own software and
memory, but also keeps his largest and most important data ﬁles on a hard disk drive that
is shared with many others. If a virus or other piece of malicious software enters the user
network (e.g. via email of another user), it may erase the contents of the shared hard drive,
and thus cause loss of proﬁt due to business interruption. The safety of the shared hard drive
depends on the diligence of all users whose desktop computers present potential points of
contamination. Therefore, a single user´s incentive to invest in loss prevention (e.g. anti virus
software, ﬁrewalls, spam-ﬁlters, etc.) is interdependent with the actions of the other users
in the community. Then, a user´s direct risk is the risk that the hard drive will be erased by
malicioussoftwareenteringthesystemthroughhisowndesktopcomputer, whiletheremaining
indirect risk is the risk that the hard drive will be erased by malicious software entering the
system through someone else´s computer. He can reduce or eliminate the ﬁrst risk by investing
in prevention, but cannot inﬂuence the latter.3
Similar effects result, for example, with investments in prevention relating to certain catastro-
phe, health or liability risks. The mounting of a sprinkler system in a company decreases the
risk of ﬁre for the neighboring company. A farming business that utilizes certain hazardous2
substances also inﬂuences the risks of surrounding farms (i.e. through changes in genetic
pools, etc). Many health risks are imposed by others. A common example is smokers creat-
ing cancer risks also for non-smokers via passive smoke, known as the second-hand smoking
problem.4Any individual investment to stop smoking beneﬁts non-smokers as well, and hence
such investment generates an externality. Risks of trafﬁc accidents are interdependent, as well.
Here, the direct risk is the risk that a careless driver causes an accident himself, the indirect
risk is the risk that the driver is involved in an accident caused by someone else. He can only
reduce the ﬁrst risk by driving more cautiously, but he can do nothing about the second one.
However, careful driving behavior diminishes the indirect risk for others.5
In many individual decision problems, as in the examples above, the possible loss cannot be
avoided completely by a preventive investment. A residual (indirect) risk remains. This risk
depends on the behavior of other agents. In general, those who invest in loss prevention in-
cur some cost (i.e. discomfort, time or money) and, in return, receive some individual beneﬁt
through the reduced individual expected loss, but a part of the beneﬁt is public: the reduced
indirect risk in the economy from which everybody else beneﬁts. Hence, there is a negative
externality associated with not investing in loss prevention, i.e. the increased risk to others. A
well-known result in public economics suggests that when externalities are present, equilib-
rium behavior is inefﬁcient. In our setting of interdependent risks, this means the total level
of preventive activities in the economy will be ”too low” relative to the socially efﬁcient level.
Therefore, a resulting risk allocation will not be efﬁcient. The challenge is to ﬁnd a solution
to the allocation problem.6
When agents face interdependent risks, it may be possible to internalize the externalities by
encouraging the agents to individually self-protect through a set of economic incentives that
makes it more attractive for some agentstoinvest inlossprevention. Insurance alters economic
incentives, and for that reason this allocationp r o b l e mm a yb es o l v e di na ni n s u r a n c em a r k e t .
Externalities may be internalized within a compulsory insurance monopoly. However, com-
pulsory insurance monopolies present a considerable intervention into the freedom of choice
of individuals and ﬁrms. Therefore, a particular justiﬁcation should be given that a compulsory
insurance monopoly may lead to a higher social level of loss prevention and, in this way, may
increase allocative efﬁciency. The rationale is that prevention externalities lead to a market
failure, and this market failure may be corrected by a compulsory insurance monopoly.7
Epple and Schäfer [1996] and Felder [1996] study the efﬁciency of compulsory insurance mo-
nopolies compared to competitive insurance markets empirically for Germany, while Jametti
and Ungern-Sternberg [2005] and Ungern-Sternberg [1996, 2003, 2004] consider Switzerland
and other European countries.8,9 The studies ﬁnd that insurance monopolies are more efﬁ-
cient than private providers (i.e. claims levels are lower), and suggest that a market with a
state-monopoly for insurance leads to a remarkably higher level of social loss prevention than
private markets. Why can insurance monopolies in practice lead to a remarkably higher social
level of loss prevention? Ungern-Sternberg [2004] attributes the efﬁciency of monopolies to3
their potential to internalize prevention externalities.10 This issue has not yet been addressed
theoretically. The present paper suggests a theoretical explanation.
Incentive problems associated with externalities have been analyzed theoretically in the insur-
anceliterature. Externalitiesoflosspreventionhavebeenstudied, thoughinadifferentcontext,
by Shavell [1982] who focuses on how liability rules and insurance affect incentives to reduce
accident risks and the allocation of such risks. Shavell [1979], Arnott and Stiglitz [1986], and
Bond and Crocker [1991] consider insurance market externalities induced by moral hazard.
Shavell [1979] addresses agents´ incentives to underconsume ”care”, which reduces the proba-
bility of loss. He ﬁnds that second-best contracts including deductibles lower those incentives,
so that agents bear part of the risk resulting from their decisions regarding ”care” themselves.
Arnott and Stiglitz [1986] derive an optimal commodity taxation system. They ﬁnd that when
agents purchase hazardous goods, taxing those goods that are complementary and subsidiz-
ing those that are substitutable for loss prevention activities affects the agents´ consumption
decisions. Bond and Crocker [1991] analyze the effects on efﬁciency and equilibrium when
consumers purchase products that are correlated with underlying loss propensities in an envi-
ronment exhibiting both moral hazard and adverse selection. They show that categorization
may permit ﬁrst-best allocations as competitive Nashequilibria. In contrast to this paper, Bond
and Crocker are concerned with the insurance market externality resulting from the increased
probability of loss by the purchaser, as opposed to any direct effects on third parties. Most of
these models consider homogenous agents or a representative individual.
The purpose of the present paper is threefold. Firstly, we study economic incentives to invest
in loss prevention for heterogenous risk-averse agents in a model with interdependent risks.
We intend to ﬁnd a solution to the above described allocation problem. Interdependencies of
risks are modeled following Kunreuther and Heal [2003].11 Secondly, we implement the con-
cept of interdependent risks to insurance markets and demonstrate that a monopolistic insurer
with imperfect information can achieve the socially optimal prevention level by engaging in
premium discrimination.12 Finally, we offer a theoretical explanation of empirical ﬁndings; in
particular, we explain why the social prevention level in markets with (compulsory) insurance
monopolies tend to be substantially higher than in competitive insurance markets.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the formal model in an expected
utility framework. We begin by analyzing the simplest case of two homogenous agents. Then
we introduce multiple agents and heterogeneity. The following section characterizes the Nash
equilibrium, ﬁrst when insurance is not available, then with insurance at actuarially fair pre-
miums. Finally, it is shown that, given compulsory insurance, a monopolistic insurer can
achieve the social optimum by engaging in premium discrimination and relying on the agents´
self-categorization. A discussion and some concluding remarks follow.4
2. A Model of Interdependent Risks
Consider an economy in which each economic agent is endowed with an initial wealth, W,
and faces a potential loss, L. An agent´s utility U(y) i saf u n c t i o no fﬁnal wealth y. The utility
function is twice continuously differentiable, increasing and strictly concave, i.e. agents are
risk-averse. The agents maximize their expected utility of ﬁnal wealth.
The agents have to decide whether or not to invest in loss prevention. This decision is a
discrete choice: an agent either invests or not. Let there be two possible ways in which a loss
can occur: it can either be caused directly by an agent himself (direct loss), or indirectly via the
actions of others (indirect loss). Losses are not additive.13 The cost of investing in prevention
is c. A direct loss can be avoided with certainty by an investment in prevention. We assume
W>c + L>0. Prevention costs should not exceed the possible loss, hence 0 ≤ c ≤ L.
Four possible states of ﬁnal wealth of an agent result: without prevention, the ﬁnal wealth of
an agent is y1 = W in case of no loss, and y2 = W − L in case of loss. If an agent invests in
prevention, his ﬁnal wealth is y3 = W − c in case of no loss and y4 = W − c − L in case of
loss.
The probability of a direct loss is p. p satisﬁes 0 <p<1. The probability that a loss is caused
indirectly by the actions of others is q(x), where x denotes the proportion of agents in the
economy without loss prevention. x satisﬁes 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. In general, the higher the proportion
of agents without prevention in the economy, the higher will be the indirect risk). We assume
q´(x) > 0 and q´´(x) ≥ 0.q (x) satisﬁes 0 ≤ q(x) ≤ q, where q(1) = q<1 and q(0) = 0.
These assumptions may be interpreted as follows. If nobody invests in prevention (x =1 ),
then q will denote the maximum indirect risk; this risk will generally be smaller than one. In
contrast, if everybody invests in prevention (x =0 ), then the indirect risk in the economy will
be zero.14
T h ee v e n t s” al o s si sc a u s e dd i r e c t l yb ya na g e n t ”(d) a n d” al o s si sc a u s e di n d i r e c t l yv i a
others” (a) are assumed to be independent. The probability of ”cause of loss occurs” in case
of no prevention is then Pr(d)+P r ( a) − Pr(d ∩ a)=p + q(x) − pq(x)=p +( 1− p)q(x).
In case of prevention, this probability is reduced to q(x).
2.1 Interdependent Risks for two Agents
The simplest situation of interdependent risks, involving only two agents, can be illustrated in
a game-theoretic framework. The payoff matrix of expected utilities for agents A1 and A2 is
s h o w ni nF i g u r e1 . 15
Suppose both agents are identical. In case of no prevention, let q(x)=q since there are
only two parties involved. If both invest in prevention, the expected utility of each agent is
U(W − c).I fA1 invests in prevention (P) but not A2 (N), A1 i so n l ye x p o s e dt ot h ei n d i r e c t
risk q from A2. Thus the expected utility of A1 is qU(W − c − L)+( 1− q)U(W − c). The
expected utility of A2 is then pU(W −L)+(1−p)U(W). If A2 invests in prevention, but not5
A1, we get the symmetrical result. If neither agent invests in prevention, then both are exposed
to the additional risk of contamination from the other. Therefore, the expected utilities for both
agents are pU(W − L)+( 1− p) {qU(W − L)+( 1− q)U(W)}.T h i si s( N,N) in Figure 1.
Assuming that both agents decide simultaneously whether or not to invest in prevention, there
is no possibility to cooperate. For P to be a dominant strategy for A1, we need16
U(W − c) ≥ pU(W − L)+( 1− p)U(W). (1)
(1) simply means that we must have c ≤ pL+π[p],w h e r eπ[p] denotes the risk premium when
the loss probability equals p.17 The prevention cost must be less than the sum of expected
direct loss and risk premium. In addition, we need
qU(W − c − L)+( 1− q)U(W − c)
≥ pU(W − L)+( 1− p){qU(W − L)+( 1− q)U(W)}, (2)
so that c ≤ p(1−q)L+π[p+(1−p)q]−π[q]. This (tighter) inequality reﬂects the possibiliy
of damage caused by the other agent. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium will be (P,P)i fc ≤
p(1−q)L+π[p+(1−p)q]−π[q]. In contrast, if c>p L+π[p], the resulting Nash equilibrium
will be (N,N). If p(1 − q)L + π[p +( 1− p)q] − π[q] <c≤ pL + π[p], both equilibria will be
possible and the solution to the game will be indeterminate.18
A2
PN
U(W − c) qU(W − c − L)+(1 − q)U(W − c)
P
U(W − c) pU(W − L)+( 1− p)U(W)
A1
pU(W − L)+( 1− p)·
pU(W − L)+( 1− p)U(W) {qU(W − L)+( 1− q)U(W)}
N
qU(W − c − L)+(1 − q)U(W − c) pU(W − L)+( 1− p)·
{qU(W − L)+( 1− q)U(W)}
Figure 1. Payoff matrix of expected utilities in a two-agent game.
Thus for c ≤ p(1 − q)L + π[p +( 1− p)q] − π[q], the equilibrium (P,P)i sp r e f e r a b l et o
the other possible equilibria. If social welfare of the agents is interpreted as the sum of their
individual expected utilities, then the optimal social solution will indeed be achieved for c ≤
p(1 − q)L + π[p +( 1− p)q] − π[q]. In the case of identical agents, we have thus found
two possible solutions to the game: either all agents invest in prevention or no one does. In
order to ﬁnd a more general solution, we introduce multiple heterogeneous agents by assuming
different prevention costs in the next section.6
2.2 Interdependent Risks for a Continuum of Agents
Let there be a continuum of heterogeneous risk-averse agents. Agents differ only in prevention
cost.19 Agents with ”low” cost will tend to invest in prevention, while those with ”high” cost
will not. Then agents can be listed in ascending order according to their individual cost c.T h e
total number of agents in the economy is normalized to unity. Prevention costs are distributed
with the (non-degenerate) distribution function F(c) and density function f(c), deﬁned over
the support [0,L]. The agents are free to choose whether or not to invest in loss prevention.
The expected utility of an agent who does not invest in loss prevention is
V (x)=pU(W − L)+( 1− p){q(x)U(W − L)+( 1− q(x))U(W)},( 3 )
while the expected utility of an agent who invests in prevention at individual cost c is given
by
R(x,c)=q(x)U(W − c − L)+( 1− q(x))U(W − c). (4)
G e n e r a l l y ,a na g e n tw i l li n v e s ti nl o s sp r e v e n t i o ni ft h eexcess of expected utility with a
preventive investment over the expected utility without such an investment is non-negative:
Ψ(x,c)=R(x,c) − V (x) ≥ 0.20For any given x,w eh a v eΨ(x,0) > 0 and Ψ(x,L) < 0.
To ﬁnd the equilibrium, deﬁne the excess ofexpectedutilitytothe marginalagentasΨ(x(b c),b c)
≡ Ψ(b c) so that
Ψ(b c)=R(b c) − V (b c),( 5 )
with
R(b c)=q(x(b c))U(W − b c − L)+( 1− q(x(b c)))U(W −b c) (6)
and
V (b c)=pU(W − L)+( 1− p){q(x(b c))U(W − L)+( 1− q(x(b c)))U(W)}, (7)
where x(b c) denotes the proportion of agents without prevention in the economy, given that the




f(c)dc =1− F(b c). (8)
dx(b c)/db c = −f(b c) < 0, i.e. the proportion of agents without prevention is strictly decreasing
in b c.21 To simplify notation, we will write the functions V (x(b c)),R (c,x(b c)) and q(x(b c)) in the
following as functions of c and b c, respectively. Along with 0 ≤ q(b c) ≤ q<1, it follows that
(1) at position b c =0
Ψ(0) = p(1 − q) ·{ U(W) − U(W − L)} > 0, (9)
(2) at position b c = L7
Ψ(L)=( 1− p){U(W − L) − U(W)} < 0, (10)
so that (1) if nobodyinvests in prevention andtherefore the indirect risk is very high, it is worth
to undertake preventive measures to reduce expected loss when prevention is costless, while
(2) if everybody invests in prevention and therefore the indirect risk is zero, then an investment
in prevention that is extremely costly (L) is not worth being undertaken to avoid the expected
direct loss pL.
(9) and (10) ensure that there exists an interior solution c∗,w h e r e0 <c ∗ <L ,that satisﬁes
Ψ(c
∗)=R(c
∗) − V (c
∗)=0 . (11)
Hence, the excess of expected utility is positive for c<c ∗ and negative for c>c ∗,s ot h a t” l o w
cost” agents with c ≤ c∗ will invest in loss prevention while ”high cost” agents with c>c ∗
will not.22 The competitive Nash equilibrium is then given by
U(W − c∗ − q(c∗)L − π[q(c∗)])
= U(W − {p +( 1− p)q(c∗)}L − π[p +( 1− p)q(c∗)]) (12)
⇒
c
∗ = p(1 − q(c
∗))L + π[p +( 1− p)q(c
∗)] − π[q(c
∗)]. (13)
The Nash equilibrium c∗ divides all agents into two groups: those who do invest in loss pre-
vention and those who don´t. Note that the Nash equilibrium is similar to the introductory
2-agents equilibrium: all agents with a cost c ≤ c∗ invest in loss prevention.
L e ts o c i a lw e l f a r eb er e p r e s e n t e db yt he utilitarian social welfare function S(b c),t h e” s u m ”
of the individual expected utilities of all agents. The socially optimal prevention level in the





R(c,b c)f(c)dc + V (b c) · x(b c). (14)
The ﬁrst term in (14) denotes the expected utilities of all agents who invest in prevention, the
second the expected utilities of all agents who do not invest in prevention. The ﬁrst-order
condition for an interior maximum of S(b c) is
dS(b c)
db c




















f(c)dc =0 . (15)8
The second and third term in (15) are non-negative (and non-decreasing in x due to q´´(x) ≥
0). The ﬁrst term in brackets is simply the excess of expected utility Ψ(b c). As a consequence,
given f(b c) > 0,S(b c) has an interior maximum at c∗∗,d e ﬁn e db y( 1 5 )s ot h a t
c
∗∗ =a r gm a x
b c
S(b c). (16)
c∗∗ isthesociallyoptimalpreventionlevel.23ConsidernowthemarginalsocialwelfaredS(b c)/db c,












|b c=c∗ · f(c)dc > 0. (17)
At the Nash equilibrium c∗, social welfare is not maximized. We have c∗∗ >c ∗ due to (17).
Hence, x(c∗∗) <x (c∗), the proportion of agents without prevention is higher in the Nash
equilibrium than in the welfare optimum. As a result, the indirect risk in the economy is ”too
high” from a social planner´s viewpoint.
Thus, we have shown that the social level of loss prevention in a situation without insurance is
”too low” from a social welfare point of view. This result is well-known in public economics:
in an economy with externalities, the equilibrium outcome is generally inefﬁcient, i.e. the
agents invest too little in prevention relative to the socially efﬁcient level.
Introducing compulsory insurance, a monopolistic insurer may act as a social planner and in
this way increase the social prevention level by setting appropriate prevention incentives using
insurance premiums. With reference to our introductory examples, we may consider terrorism
insurance in the case of aircraft security, loss of proﬁts insurance (business interruption insur-
ance) in the case of internet risks, health insurance in case of smokers, and liability insurance,
respectively. This issue is studied in the next section.
3. Compulsory Insurance Monopoly
Consider a risk-neutral monopolistic insurer with no transaction costs. Insurance is compul-
sory, thus there is full market participation and coverage is provided to all agents. Let us
assume that insurance premiums are subject to public regulation in the sense that the expected
proﬁts of the monopolist are limited (for example by government) to some constant k ≥ 0.24
By concluding insurance contracts, agents substitute their expected uncertain loss-expenses
for the payment of a certain insurance premium. An insurance policy (P,I) consists of a
premium paid by an agent regardless of state P a n da ni n d e m n i ﬁcation payment I in case of
loss. Without loss of generality, we assume that losses are completely reimbursed after an
accident occurs, i.e. there is no risk sharing between the insurer and its customers. Thus the
indemniﬁcation payment I in case of loss equals L. For the time being, we suppose that the
monopolist offers an actuarially fair price, so the premium equals the individual expected loss9
of a policyholder (i.e. the expected loss with and without an investment in loss prevention,
respectively). We therefore begin the analysis, as a point of reference, by assuming zero
expected proﬁts of the monopolist (k =0 ).25
The policyholders can be divided into two groups: ”low cost” agents who tend to invest in loss
prevention and ”high cost” agents who don´t. While the insurer cannot, in general, observe
individual prevention cost, it may, however, assign fair premiums to policyholders when it
has information about the social prevention level and to which group a policyholder belongs.
Suppose that the insurer can neither observe individual prevention cost nor an individual in-
vestment in prevention. It has, however, an idea about the distribution of costs in the economy.
We make the reasonable assumption that the agents voluntarily provide evidence of their pre-
v e n t i v em e a s u r e st ot h ei n s u r e ri no r d e rt og e tt he lower (fair) premium based on their lower
risk. Assuming further that risk revelation imposes no additional cost to a policyholder, an
agent with ”low cost” and for whom prevention is worthwhile has indeed an incentive to truth-
fully reveal himself as being a ”good risk”.26 In addition, the insurer can easily determine the
cost of the marginal agent and therefore the social prevention level; it does not need any in-
formation about individual prevention costs (i.e. in the following, from (20) follows directly
(23)).
Given a social prevention level b c, let the fair premium of an agent not investing in prevention
be P0(b c)={p +( 1− p)q(b c)}L and for an agent investing in prevention P(b c)=q(b c)L.27
Then the expected utility of an agent who does not invest in prevention is (under full insurance
coverage, i.e. I = L):
pU(W − L + I − P0(b c)) + (1 − p){q(b c)·
U(W − L + I − P0(b c)) + (1 − q(b c))U(W − P0(b c))}
= U(W − P0(b c)), (18)
while the expected utility of an agent who invests in prevention is given by
q(b c)U(W − L + I − c − P(b c)) + (1 − q(b c))U(W − c − P(b c))
= U(W − c − P(b c)). (19)
An individual investment in loss prevention is attractive to an agent if
Φ(c,b c)=U(W − c − P(b c)) − U(W − P0(b c)) ≥ 0. (20)
Let again Φ(b c,b c) ≡ Φ(b c), then along with 0 ≤ q(b c) ≤ q<1, it follows that
(1) at position b c =0
Φ(0) = U(W − qL) − U(W − pL − (1 − p)qL) > 0, (21)
(2) at position b c = L10
Φ(L)=U(W − L) − U(W − pL) < 0, (22)
so that Φ(b c) has an interior solution cI∗ at Φ(cI∗)=0 ,w h e r e0 <c I∗ <L .Thus we have
c
I∗ = p(1 − q(c
I∗))L.( 2 3 )
cI∗ is the Nash equilibrium with insurance at actuarially fair premiums.28 At the equilibrium
cI∗, the fair premium for agents investing in prevention is given by P(cI∗)=q(cI∗)L and
for agents not investing is P0(cI∗)={p +( 1− p)q(cI∗)}L, respectively, corresponding to
individual expected loss with and without an investment in loss prevention.




U(W − c − P(b c))f(c)dc + U(W − P0(b c)) · x(b c). (24)
K e e p i n gi nm i n dt h a tdx(b c)/db c = −f(b c), the ﬁrst-order condition for an interior maximum of
e S(b c) implies
de S(b c)
db c
= {U(W − b c − P(b c)) − U(W − P0(b c))}·f(b c)
+





∂U(W − c − P(b c))
∂b c
f(c)dc =0 . (25)
Thus e S(b c) has an interior maximum at cI∗∗ so that
c
I∗∗ =a r gm a x
b c
e S(b c). (26)




dU(W − P0(b c))
db c





∂U(W − c − P(b c))
∂b c
|b c=cI∗ · f(c)dc > 0. (27)
Hence cI∗ <c I∗∗ results. This implies that x(cI∗) >x (cI∗∗), the proportion of agents with-
out prevention is higher in the Nash equilibrium than in the welfare optimum. Clearly, given
insurance is available at fair premiums, the social prevention level is not optimal. Again, ex-
ternalities are not internalized in the Nash equilibrium.
The insurer may engage in premium discrimination in order to raise the social prevention
level. In particular, it may design different contracts for different risk types, relying on the11
policyholders´ self-categorization: it may offer a premium rebate - relative to the fair premium
- for low risk agents (i.e. those investing in prevention), and/or it may impose a premium
loading for high risk agents (i.e. those not investing in prevention), and let agents voluntarily
decide whether or not to invest in loss prevention. The sequence of the considered game
between the insurer and its customers may then be seen as follows. At a ﬁrst stage, the insurer
offers appropriate contracts including a premium loading and rebate on fair premiums. At a
second stage, the customers choose a contract and decide simultaneously on the basis of their
individual cost whether or not to invest in prevention.
The insurer may act like a social planner by demanding premiums that do not only depend
on the actuarial value of the policy, i.e. the expected loss, but depend also on the ”prevention
behavior” of the agents. In this way, the social prevention level would rise and individual
expected loss of each agent would decrease. For this reason, risk categorization may increase
allocative efﬁciency.
In the following, we will show that the monopolist may shift the social prevention level in the
economy up to the optimal level by engaging in premium discrimination. Completely insured
agents act like risk neutral decision makers. Therefore, since our focus is on optimal risk
allocation, the expected utility of agents with and without an investment in prevention is given
by W − c − P(b c) and W − P0(b c), respectively.
For agents who do not invest in prevention, the insurer may offer a premium P0(b c)+γ,w h e r e
γ > 0 denotes a premium penalty (loading). For agents who invest in prevention, it may offer
ap r e m i u mP(b c) − δ,w h e r eδ > 0 denotes a premium rebate. We will argue in the following
that the insurer may achieve the socially optimal prevention level in the economy by offering
a combination of rebates and penalties on fair premiums, and at the same time make non-
negative expected proﬁts k ≥ 0. Hence, the insurer engages in premium discrimination so
that the agents individually place themselves into one of two categories: those who invest in
prevention and those who don´t. This result i ss h o w ni nt h ef o l l o w i n gP r o p o s i t i o n .
Proposition: The insurer can induce the socially optimal prevention level cI∗∗ by engaging in
premium discrimination: it can charge a premium penalty γ∗ on fair premiums for agents who
do not invest in prevention and offer a premium rebate δ
∗ on fair premiums for agents who do.
The optimum is induced by setting ˆ c = cI∗∗ for premiums.
Proof. The marginal agent is indifferent between prevention and no prevention if
W − ˆ c − {P(b c) − δ} = W − {P0(b c)+γ}. (28)
Letusreferto(28)astheincentiveconstraint. Assumingfurtherthattheinsurertriestoachieve
the maximum-permitted proﬁt k ≥ 0 , an optimal premium discrimination mechanism must
ensure that the expected proﬁto ft h ei n s u r e re q u a l sk. Therefore, we must have
γ · x(ˆ c) − δ ·{ 1 − x(ˆ c)} = k ≥ 0. (29)12
Let us refer to (29) as the participation constraint.30Social welfare is given by the ”sum” of




{W − c − (P(b c) − δ)}f(c)dc + {W − (P0(b c)+γ)}·x(b c)+k. (30)




{W − c − P(b c)}f(c)dc + {W − P0(b c)}·x(b c). (31)
The incentive constraint (28) together with the participation constraint (29) becomes
p(1 − q(b c))L − b c +
γ
1 − x(b c)
−
k
1 − x(b c)
=0 . (32)




{W − c − P(b c)}f(c)dc + {W − P0(b c)}·x(b c)
+λ
½
p(1 − q(b c))L − b c +
γ
1 − x(b c)
−
k
1 − x(b c)
¾
, (33)







1 − x(b c)
¾
=0 . (34)
Since the term in braces is positive for any b c>0, λ =0results. Therefore, (33) is re-
d u c e dt o( 3 1 ) ,w h i c hi sa ti t sm a x i m u ma tcI∗∗. Hence, the optimal value for the cutoff level is
ˆ c = cI∗∗.32 ¤
It can be shown in the same way that the socially optimal prevention level is achievable by
imposing a premium loading e γ on fair premiums for high risk agents (those who do not invest
in prevention) and by insuring low risk agents (those who do) at their fair premium. Theoret-
ically, the optimum may also be induced by offering a premium rebate e δ for low risk agents
a n db yi n s u r i n gh i g hr i s ka g e n t sa tt h e i rf a i rpremium. However, a rebate is not a plausible
solution to the externality problem since it implies negative expected proﬁts for the insurer, i.e.
the participation constraint is not fulﬁlled.
The social optimum can also be induced in a setting where low risk agents pay a zero premium
and high risk agents pay a high loading. The idea behind this setting is that the insurer may
set prices according to causation. Then the ”originators” (high risk agents) are made fully
responsible for the externalities caused by them. In this special case, the damaged parties (i.e.13
low risk agents who would not suffer any loss if not for those high risk agents) would pay zero
premiums.
The previous proposition demonstrates that the insurer may shift the social prevention level up
to the optimum and thereby ensure an efﬁc i e n tr i s ka l l o c a t i o ni nt he economy. This outcome
is shown under very general conditions, since constraining the monopoly proﬁtt ob ee q u a lt o
some constant k rather than zero has no qualitative impact on the results.
4. Discussion and Conclusion
Casual observation suggests that an agent´s decision to self-protect often affects the loss prob-
abilities faced by others. As well-known in public economics, when externalities are present
the equilibrium outcome will be inefﬁcient. In an economy with interdependent risks, this re-
sult implies economic agents invest too little in loss prevention relative to the socially efﬁcient
level by ignoring marginal external costs or beneﬁts conferred on others. Given interdependent
risks in an insurance market, this paper examines the possibility that the social prevention level
is improved by a monopolistic insurer engaging in premium discrimination.
The paper makes two contributions to the insurance literature. Firstly, it analyzes an insurance
market with externalities of loss prevention in a model with multiple heterogenous risk-averse
agents. When risks are interdepen d e n t ,t h es o c i a lp r e v e n t i o nl e v e l-b o t hi nc a s eo fn oi n s u r -
ance and with (compulsory) insurance at actuarially fair premiums - is not socially efﬁcient.
The indirect risk in the economy is too high from a social planner´s viewpoint. However,
a monopolistic insurer with imperfect information may achieve the optimum by engaging in
premium discrimination. Premiums are optimally chosen to reﬂe c ts o c i a lc o s to rb e n e ﬁt. For
instance, an agent who invests in loss prevention may enjoy a premium rebate not only for the
r e d u c e di n d i v i d u a le x p e c t e dl o s s ,b u ta l s of o rt h er e d u c t i o ni ne x p e c t e dl o s st oo t h e r s . T h e
insurer designs different contracts for different risk types, relying on the agents´ incentives to
self-protect.
The second contribution is a theoretical explanation of empirical ﬁndings. The social preven-
tion level in markets with (compulsory) insurance monopolies tends to be substantially higher
(and therefore the claims levels tend to be lower) than in competitive insurance markets. An
inefﬁcient outcome may result because in competitive insurance markets with interdependent
risks, no allocative efﬁciency seems to be attainable, whether insurance is compulsory or not.
The rationale for the latter is as follows. Supp o s eam a r k e tw i t hm a n yr i s kn e u t r a li n s u r e r s
being in competition to attract customers, and suppose insurers act so as to maximize expected
proﬁts. The only policies that will survive in the market are those that yield zero expected
proﬁts to insurers and, given this constraint, the highest possible expected utility to agents.
Arbitrarily risk-averse agents will buy full insurance coverage if the price of insurance is ac-
tuarially fair.33 As a consequence, full insurance at fair premiums results and the competitive
Nash equilibrium corresponds to cI∗. However, we have shown that in an environment involv-14
ing externalities of loss prevention, social welfare is not optimal at cI∗. Due to the possibility
of adverse selection in this market, an insurer acting in a competitive market environment can-
not induce high risk agents to pay a premium loading, i.e. other insurers may undercut the
demanded price by ignoring externalities. The only premium for which there is no incentive
to undercut a rival ﬁrm is the fair premium. As a result, externalities cannot be internalized in
a competitive insurance market.
A further intuitive argument is that in a competitive insurance market, when an insurer under-
takes actions that reduce the riskiness of its policyholders (i.e. engaging in premium discrim-
ination), it will run the risk of competing insurers free-riding on its achievements in reducing
the risks. Therefore, an insurer acting in a competitive insurance market will have little or
no incentive (compared to the monopolist) to engage in premium discrimination, given that
competitors may enjoy the beneﬁts at no cost. Hence, there seems to be a strong argument for
a monopolistic insurer in an insurance market with interdependent risks.
Regarding the roles of insurance coverage and premiums, our model is not rich enough to
allow agents to choose partial insurance coverage. However, full insurance would be chosen if
premiums were actuarially fair, and so the Nash equilibrium with insurance at fair premiums
derived here would also hold in that case. Since the premiums in our model are marginally fair,
i.e. include a ﬁxed loading fee (or rebate), f u l li n s u r a n c ei so p t i m a l . 34 Hence, the assumption
of full insurance coverage does not restrict the analysis, but simpliﬁes it.
The model might be extended in the following ways. The probability of a direct loss p was
taken as constant among policyholders. This assumption is undoubtedly very restrictive, but
it is for simplicity reasons only. Since p only affects the individual expected loss and not
t h ei n d i r e c tr i s ki nt h ee c o n o m y( g i v e nt h ea s sumptions above), agents differing in both p
and c m i g h tb ei n t e g r a t e di nt h ea n a l ysis without changing results substantially. In fact, the
externality is independent of p and would therefore not be affected by this generalization of
the model.
Also, loss prevention has been modeled as a discrete choice, i.e. an agent can either invest
in loss prevention or not. An extension to a setting where loss prevention is a continuous
variable would change the results as follows. If loss prevention is continuous, agents who
invest in prevention - those who did not imposea n ye x t e r n a l i t yo no t h e r si no u rm o d e l-w i l l
then impose some externality on others, too, given that the probability p cannot (always) be
reduced to zero. In our model, some agents - those with prevention costs higher than the Nash
equilibrium but lower than the social optimum - do not behave efﬁciently, while the others
do. In a model with continuous loss prevention, however, all agents will undertake less than
optimal prevention since they do not take into account the social beneﬁt of their individual
prevention effort. Therefore, the equilibrium prevention level will be inefﬁcient. When the
insurer has full information, it might set premiums according to individual efforts, and might
in this way achieve the social optimum.
Analternativeinstrumenttointernalizeexternalitiesof losspreventionisliabilitylaw. Liability15
requirements tend to improve the agents´ incentives to reduce risks. An optimal liability rule
sets incentives for efﬁcient loss prevention (care). Common liability rules in economic theory
of liability law are strict liability and the negligence rule. Under strict liability injurers must
pay for all losses that they cause. Under the negligence rule an injurer is held liable for losses
he causes only he if was negligent, i.e. only if his level of care is less than a level speciﬁed
by courts, the level of due care. Generally, when the probability of loss depends on preventive
efforts of both injurer and victim, the negligence rule is optimal when the level of due care is
set equal to the socially efﬁcient level. In contrast, in this case, strict liability is not optimal
sincethereisnoincentivefor thevictimtobehaveefﬁciently.35 However, in our model only the
injurer is able to reduce the probability of loss (i.e. we analyze the case of unilateral losses).
Therefore, the socially efﬁcient level of care may be induced via strict liability as well, since a
potential injurer wouldinanycase internalize theentire liability risk. As a result, strict liability
and the negligence rule are equivalent.
It should be observed that liability rules are generally studied in a setting with risk neutral
agents. In a setting with risk-averse agents, however, strict liability might not be optimal
any more. As our introductory examples suggest, in a world with interdependent risks, an
injurer might often cause losses to many victims, and thus strict liability might lead to a risk
accumulation while the negligence rule spreads the risk.36 So the negligence rule seems to be
better in terms of risk allocation due to the possibility of many victims.
Nevertheless, liability law may not work any more in order to internalize externalities of loss
prevention when the injurer cannot be identiﬁed. In a setting with interdependent risks, loss
prevention generally spreads and the actual injurer may not (easily) be found. As a result,
liability law is indeed an alternative instrument in order to internalize externalities of loss
prevention, but under more general conditions involving information problems, there might
be situations where it seems more reasonable to internalize prevention externalities ex ante
(before a loss actually takes place) via insurance premiums, and not ex post (after a loss has
occurred) via liability law where the injurer has to be identiﬁed. A monopoly insurer may
overcome such information problems.
Clearly, in a competitive insurance market, insurance regulation may solve the externality
problem, as well. A regulator may offer a tax cut on insurance contracts for low risks and
impose higher tax rates for high risks. Regulation would then provide the same incentives in
the insurance market as an insurance monopoly engaging in premium discrimination. How-
ever, an insurer will generally be better informeda b o u tp r e v e n t i o nc o s t s ,r i s ka v e r s i o na n dl o s s
probabilities of its policyholders than a regulator. It might be socially desirable to implement
a monopoly insurer to solve this task by regulating only the insurer´s expected proﬁt.
Finally, the efﬁciency gain of price discrimination by the insurer should be weighted against
disadvantages that are generally associated with monopolies. Since a monopolist is not forced
by competitive threat to operate at lowest cost, it may not be as productively efﬁcient as an
insurer in a competitive insurance market. Furthermore, it may not have the same innovation16
incentive and therefore may not want to reduce costs in the same way. Given that innovation
seems to play an important role in some lines of insurance only, these shortcomings seem not
so important in insurance markets when compared to other markets.
Note also that the analysis includes some equity efﬁciency trade-off: it may not be the case
that all agents in the insurance market are better off after the introduction of premium dis-
crimination. This generally depends on the parameters in the model and the distribution of
prevention costs. However, the possibility of an internalization of externalities necessarily
implies such sort of trade-off. The efﬁciency will always be improved in the sense of Kaldor-
Hicks efﬁciency, but not necessarily in the sense of Pareto efﬁciency. Thus, a more efﬁcient
outcome might in fact leave some agents worse off. Therefore, losses in equity due to pre-
mium discrimination need to be weighted against the social costs of the market failure that it
seeks to overcome. Generally, the potential efﬁciency gain of an insurance monopoly relative
to a competitive insurance market will depend on the magnitude of externalities in the market
considered. Thus, the more important externalities in the market are, the more an insurance
monopoly seems to make sense.17
Notes
1. In the literature, loss prevention is often called ”self-protection” to mean a reduction in
the probability of loss without affecting the magnitude of loss, while loss reduction is
called ”self-insurance”, which means a reductionin the magnitude of loss without affecting
the probability of loss. This distinction was originally introduced by Ehrlich and Becker
[1972].
2. This problem of interdependent security was ﬁrst analyzed by Kunreuther and Heal [2003]
in a game-theoretic framework. Note the empirical relevance by recalling the events of
September 11, where security failures at airports in Boston, New Jersey, and Washington
D.C. led to crashes at the World Trade Center and in Pennsylvania.
3. See Kearns [2005], p. 40-47.
4. See Lee [2005], p. 156.
5. Some further examples of interdependent risks are provided by Avery et al. [1995].
6. Clearly, the allocation problem would not arise if economic agents had the possibility to
carry out free negotiations and to conclude binding contracts (given a world with perfect
information and without transaction costs). Then those damaged by externalities would
pay the liable party a compensation for undertaking preventive measures. Free negotiations
then lead to the Pareto-optimal prevention level. See Coase [1960]. Mathematical proof on
this can be found in Gifford and Stone [1973].
7. A further argument may be that, if insurance were not compulsory, there might possibly
be unsufﬁcient demand for insurance coverage. In the case of terrorism or natural hazard
insurance, for example, agents may anticipate ﬁnancial relief from the government in case
of loss. In fact, a government cannot afford - due to political and social reasons - to leave
victims of terrorism or natural catastrophes such as ﬂoods or earthquakes uncompensated.
Therefore, public programs making relief to victims contingent on individual prevention
investments cannot be considered credible. The agents tend to free-ride by not investing
(enough) in loss prevention, and trust in government relief in case of loss. Government
relief therefore distorts private incentives. A market failure results that may be solved by
compulsory insurance. See, for example, Kaplow [1991]. In Spain, for instance, the free-
rider problem is solved by a state-run insurance monopoly for natural catastrophe risks.
See, for instance, Ungern-Sternberg [2004], pp. 56-74.
8. This efﬁciency can be studied particularly well in Switzerland due to the Swiss dual system
in property insurance. In nineteen of the twenty six Swiss cantons, house owners are re-
quired by law to obtain coverage for natural catastrophes and ﬁre from cantonal insurance
providers. This coverage is only available with private insurance companies in the remain-
ing seven cantons. The cantonal insurance monopolies are found to be more efﬁcient than
p r i v a t ep r o v i d e r s .C l a i m sl e v e l sa r el o w e ra n dt h e r ei sah i g h e rs o c i a li n v e s t m e n ti nl o s s
prevention. Cantonal insurance monopolies earn a low or zero rate of return, insurance pre-
miums are regulated on a cantonal basis, and the creation of a minimum reserve is required18
by law.
9. In general, loss prevention activities in a society can be of collective or individual nature.
For example, collective measures target at general ﬁre-protection or the mitigation of ﬂood
risks in certain exposed areas. In the case of an investment in collective prevention by
the insurer, compulsory insurance is important in order to induce the monopolist to under-
take those investments. Note that without compulsory insurance, if the monopolist could
manipulate loss probabilities by an investment in collective loss prevention, one option of
an agent would be to enjoy the lower loss probability, but not to purchase any insurance
coverage. Hence, a key feature of an investment in collective prevention by the insurer
is the nonexcludability of agents who choose not to purchase insurance from also experi-
encing the reduction in loss probability. See Schlesinger and Venezian [1986]. However,
a large part of preventive activities is individual in nature. These measures are individual
investments that target at the reduction of individual expected loss. We focus on preventive
activities of individual nature in this paper. Therefore, the insurer’s premiums should be
calculated to motivate the policyholders to individually invest in loss prevention. From the
insurer´s viewpoint, this makes perfect economic sense because it beneﬁts from a higher
social prevention level (resulting in lower expected claims payments). Thus the insurer has
an economic reason to subsidize preventive activities in the economy.
10. See Ungern-Sternberg [2004], pp. 112-113.
11. Kunreuther and Heal [2003] have analyzed the interdependencies of terrorism risks in the
context ofinternationalairline security foridenticaland risk neutral agents. Theyexpanded
their work to a more general model of interdependent risks in Heal and Kunreuther [2004].
In the general model, three classes of problems of Interdependent Security (IDS) are de-
rived: a Class 1 problem [Partial Protection], a Class 2 problem [Complete Protection], and
a Class 3 problem [Positive Externalities]. In an IDS-problem of the ﬁrst class, the risk of
loss cannot be completely eliminated by an investment in security, there remains a residual
indirect risk from others. This situation is the one illustrated in our examples. An example
for a class 2 problem is a market for vaccination. This is characterized by the fact that the
risk of loss can be completely eliminated by an investment in protection, the vaccine. In an
IDS-problem of the third class, positive externalities arise. An example is investments in
research and development. This paper focuses on an IDS-problem of the ﬁrst class which
seems to be the most important. However, the model can be applied to other IDS-problems.
12. In an insurance market with different risk types, an insurer often uses observable or known
criteria that may be related to the underlying risk in order to sort the policyholders in
categories for which different policies are sold. This categorization is often referred to as
”discrimination”.
13. A loss can only occur once. The maximum loss is L, even if both possible causes of loss
occur at the same time. See also Heal and Kunreuther [2004].
14. Referring to the airline baggage security example, the probabilities p and q(x) can be un-
derstood as follows. p is the probability of damage arising on an agent´s (airline´s) own19
property (aircraft) if the agent has not invested in security (direct loss). The expected loss
from this event is pL. If the agent has invested in a security system this risk is zero. The
probability that a bag containing a bomb and accepted for carriage by one airline is trans-
ferred by it to another is q(x). See Kunreuther and Heal [2002, 2003].
15. This section follows Kunreuther and Heal [2003]. The novelty is the introduction of risk
aversion.
16. If A1 is indifferent between N and P, we assume that he invests in prevention. It sufﬁces
to investigate the dominance of a strategy for A1, since the situation is symmetric for both
agents.
17. The risk premium, as we use it here, was introduced by Pratt [1964]. For any concave
utility function U(·), the risk premium π[p] is deﬁned by the equation pU(W − L)+( 1−
p)U(W)=U(W − pL − π[p]).T h er i s kp r e m i u mπ[p] denotes the maximum an agent is
willing to pay to securely receive the expected value of the probability distribution instead
of the probability distribution itself.
1 8 .W ea s s u m eh e r et h a tp(1 − q)L + π[p +( 1− p)q] − π[q] is smaller than pL + π[p] and
therefore represents a tighter inequality. This seems to be true in most cases. However, if
p(1 − q)L + π[p +( 1− p)q] − π[q] exceeds pL + π[p], the equilibria would be reversed,
but there would still be only two equilibria.
19. Alternatively, it could be assumed that the agents have different prevention technologies.
T h e yc a na v o i dad i r e c tl o s sb yu s i n gs u c hat echnology. Different technologies cause
different costs.
20. Without loss of generality, we assume that an agent invests in prevention when he is indif-
ferent between investing and not investing.
21. Externalities have been analyzed in a similar way by Brito et al. [1991] who investigate a
marketforvaccinesagainstinfectiousdiseases. TheirmodelreferstoMirrlees’conclusions
of optimal taxation. See Mirrlees [1971].
22. It cannot be shown in general that the interior solution is unique for all possible parameters
in Ψ(b c). In the more interesting case with insurance (see the next section), a sufﬁcient
condition for a strict monotonic relationship between the excess of expected utility and
the threshold prevention cost b c is −q´(b c)L ≤ 1. Since the indirect risk in the economy
inﬂuences the impact of the direct risk p on individual loss prevention, the marginal return
of loss prevention should not be very high. However, this condition is for technical reasons
only. In reasonable numerical examples, a unique equilibrium always results. Finally, the
case in which there might be more than one interior solutions makes no economic sense
and is therefore not relevant throughout the paper. We thus consider only the relevant
monotonic cases.
23. Note that at c∗∗ there is indeed a maximum since dS(b c)/db c is positive at b c =0and negative
at b c = L.
24. This assumption is necessary to limit the insurer´s proﬁt to a maximum. If we assumed
proﬁt maximization for the insurer, it would - as a consequence of compulsory insurance20
-d e m a n di n ﬁnitely high premiums. The results of our model would then be implausible.
Thus a restriction is needed here. Note that this restriction has some empirical justiﬁcation
in Switzerland: the property insurance monopolies in the Swiss cantons are under public
control and earn a low or zero rate of return. See Jametti and Ungern-Sternberg [2005], p.
27. Note also that there might be an incentive for the monopolist to behave inefﬁciently.
However, there seems to be no empirical evidence which might support this hypothesis.
Therefore, we do not analyze the insurer´s incentive problem in more detail.
25. This assumption is only by notational convenience and without any loss of generality. Con-
straining the monopoly proﬁt to be an arbitrary value (including a general margin or pre-
mium loading) rather than zero has no qualitative impact on the results in this section or
throughout the paper. We refrain from introducing a general margin since this is not an
issue in our model.
26. Alternatively, it might be assumed that the insurer can costlessly observe whether an agent
invests in loss prevention, but cannot observe individual prevention cost. The insurer is
unable to distinguish between agents except through their choices.
27. Without prevention, the probability of loss given a social prevention level of b c is {p+(1−
p)q(b c)}. With prevention, this probability is reduced to q(b c). See (6) and (7), respectively.
28. Comparing cI∗ to c∗, observe that the equilibrium c∗ includes some risk premium. This
is due to the risk aversion of the agents. Being now fully compensated in case of loss,
the completely insured agents act as if they were risk neutral. Therefore, no risk premium
appears in the equilibrium cI∗. Indeed, the Nash equilibrium is actually the same as with
risk neutral policyholders.
29. Again, note that at cI∗∗ t h e r ei si n d e e dam a x i m u ms i n c ede S(b c)/db c is positive at b c =0and
negative at b c = L.
30. The participation constraint states that the insurer should make non-negative expectedprof-
its because otherwise it would not be interested in premium discrimination. Without loss
of generality, we may assume that the insurer has still an incentive to engage in premium
discrimination when its expected proﬁts are zero.
31. Note that
R b c
0 δf(c)dc − γx(b c)=δ(1 − x(b c)) − γx(b c)=−k.
32. δ
∗ = {cI∗∗ − p(1 − q(cI∗∗))L} x(cI∗∗) − k and γ∗ = cI∗∗ − p(1 − q(cI∗∗))L − δ
∗ result.
This is due to (28) and (29). Since the premium rebate for agents investing in prevention δ
∗
should not exceed the fair premium (P(cI∗∗)−δ
∗ ≥ 0), the proﬁt of the monopolist should
meet a minimum k ≥ {cI∗∗ − p(1 − q(cI∗∗))L}x(cI∗∗) − q(cI∗∗)L.
33. See, for instance, Arrow [1963], Mossin [1968], Smith [1968] or Doherty [1975].
34. Note that this outcome includes the implicit assumption that a contract with partial insur-
ance is calculated so as to fully internalize the externality.
35. We restrict our discussion to the pure forms of strict liability and the negligence rule here.
36. See, for instance, Nell and Richter [2003], p. 32.21
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